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There are two purposes in this paper. One is to elucidate
the change of scientific thought from later 18th century to early
19th century in conformity with a conversion of one foundamental
concept, causality. The other is to grasp one of the turning points
in the problem-history of causality. I had showed that the concept
of Kraft (force), especially of Lebenskraft was possible only in the
special mode of causality.1 In this paper, I will focus my glasses
on the history of concept of Kraft and causality.
The change of intellectual framework in this period has been
discussed by some people. M. Foucault pointed out the change
of isomorphic structure in lmgistics, economics and biology in
this period.2 And S. Yamasaki mentioned the Industrial Revo-
lution, the French Revolution and the Romantic Philosophy. In
the history of science, this period is called the Scientific Revolution
II, mainly m view of institutionalization of science through the
French Revolution in France and the foundation of the Berlin
university m Germany.4 Certainly in this period, electromagnetics,
chemistry, biology and mineralogy are m a great alteration. The
foundamental transformation of views seems pregnant in the
conversion of the intellectual frameworks, which some indexes
point out, that is for example, atoms, organizations, the recon-
struction of geological features with fire and water, the interchange
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of electricity and magnetism, etc.
Then I will define the problematic. In all the papers published
so far concerning the conversion of the concept of causality, there
seems to be three main points: the first is transmission from
dynamic cause to formal caused the second is the exclusion of
cause which does not accompany time passage and its limitation
on time,e the third is the negation of the equivalence of cause-
effect,i And these three properties have been looked upon as have
no relations to each other. The first one does not refer to time,
and the third one is separate from the first or the second. But
these three properties appeared m the same period. Considering
this fact, it is possible to presume that there should be certain
relations among them. Therefore, my purpose in this paper is
to elucidate how these properties are connected wiht each other,
and to show their differences are ascribed to the differences of
viewpoints on a certain situation which is to be clarified in the
course of discussion of my paper.
In the first section, I give an outline of the concept of causality
unto later 18th century, and identify the properties of the concept.
In the second section, I describe the special mode of force and
causality in that period. In the third section, I discuss the
viewpoints on that situation and show how these three properties
become separated m that very situation.
I.
There are two turning points in the history of causality in
modern science, in the mid-17th century, and in the turn of the
18th century to 19th century, which this paper treats. From
ancient to the mid-17th century, formal cause is predoillinant. In
this view, quality of things is present in things themselves and
Force and Causality 31
it causes the change of things. This quality is common to all
species that constitute one class. According to the classification
of the class, natural phenomena can be explained.
From the mid-17th century to the late 18th century, the concept
of dynamic cause is predominant. The change of the transfig-
uration of things does not depend on their own quality, but is
possibly brought only by external agents, for example, a shock,
a pressure, or an action etc. Matter has the quality of impene-
trability or extension alone, and it is possible for matter to change
only by external dynamic agent. In this case, the change in general
is limited to the change of position in space and that of combination
of things. Matter without mobility can change no other than by
external cause, and then qualitative change and production or
dispersion of things are excluded. Therefore, causality is
grasped in the limited change m this time, that is, the change of
position in space.
Here we can recognize that the quality of causality discussed
in the Scholastic Philosophy reappeared in the mathematical
formulation. In fact, Descartes insisted as his principle that there
must be as much reality in cause as in effect. And this principle
was concreted into so-called the law of conservation of momentum.
This principle was formulated with further exactness. Galileo
regarded dynamic cause as necessary and sufficient condition for
existence of the things, and insisted that what produces effect,
without which effect would be lost, must be regarded as cause.9
This opinion contains not only the principle of equivalency of
cause-effect (causa aequat effectum) but also interchangibility of
cause and effect. In this case mechanical events are adequate for
this principle but cheillical reactions or biological processes are
not. We should judge that mechanism succeeded by limiting the
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mode of change to the above-mentioned determinations.
In this case, Galileo regarded `force'as the true cause of
physical phenomena. And Descartes, who did not admit the con-
cept of force at first, related it with movement foundamentally.10
Newton enlarged the concept of force from only force of motion
to dynamic cause that produces the difference of the condition of
motion. This concept of force as active agent is invariable in the
process of motion and can produce the change of motion. On
account of it, this concept is too much different from the concept
of cause in causal relations. But he transferred this concept to
cause in general in his system, therefore cause in causal relation
and cause as the ground of the change of motion were coexisted
being named force. Certainly two kinds of force were confused
in his system.ll
But only Newton did not confuse them. In Descartes'proof
of the being of God, he insisted the infinity of God himself is the
cause of the being of God.12 In these views, logical ground and
cause was equated each other and in a case these two were
expressed as force. After all the concept of force was generalized
ultimate cause of things.
This fact was noticed in 18th century. C. Wolff insisted that
ground and cause must not be mixtured, and Reimars defined the
former as internal ground, the latter as external ground.13 Even-
tually this confusion was habitual in 18th century. Later Kant
gave one important solution to this problem.
Up to this day, mechanism and hylozoism have been listed
as the main thoughts in 18th century.14 We see the same confusion
in hylozoism. Diderot, who limited change of matters to the
transfiguration, put inherence with sensibility into matters. It is
this principle of sensibility that produces transfiguration, and is
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invariable through it. In other words, this principle is dynamic
and external to the change. Even if this principle is inherent in
matters, it has the same logical structure.
In sum, cause in modern science before 19th century was
external agents that subsist m matters, things and conditions with
or without the passage of time, and then cause and effect is equiv-
alent in that cause-effect relation. And physical agent in such
cause corresponds to force. When the concept of causality like
this varies, there seemed to be huge immediate changes.in all of
the intellectual situations. I will study these situations referring
to the concept of force.
II.
In later 18th century, so-called Romanticism raised its head
in physics. It tried to regard nature not as natura naturata but
natura naturans, and introduced force into physics as subsist-
ence which is productive of natural phenomena. Force is no longer
a principle inherent m matters like m hylozoism. It is generalized
for all of nature. In seizing the formation of nature and unifying
various natural phenonlena with force, its meaning inevitably
varied. For that reason, the concept has greatly various meanings.
These very varieties set no other than the starting point of shift
of the concept.
Herder tried to grasp the general history of nature and
mankind, and starting from the history of earth, he placed all the
ages and several people in the phases of the history of mankind.
Herder conceived that extrapolated mental power into natural
phenomena came to be this force. It is force for him that realizes
productive formation of natural beings. And it is in nature that
makes progress m itself.15 But the mode of inherence is no longer
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ground for the change of matter in hylozoism. In fact, though
this concept of force has quality of agents, it corresponds to form
in relation of matter-form.
Bildung ist's, eine Wirkung innerer Krafte, denen die Natur
eine Masse vorbereitet、 hatte, die sie sich zubilden, in der sie
sichtbar machen sollten.16
Das Kraft und Organ zwar innigst verbunden, nicht aber
eins und dasselbe sei. Die Materie unseres Korpers war da,
aber gestalt und leblos, ehe sie die organischen Kr云fte bildeten
und belebten.
Certainly the force as formalizing agent is not as much as
mode of existence of matter and it is not cause by way of the ground
of the change of matter. But Herder considered as if force, which
is a formalizing agent, belongs to the dynamic relation among
matters. And then, force itself is invisible and immortal, because
it produces visible form and still remains after the exclusion of
all forms of matter. In sum, force is invisible, immortal,
formalizing agent and formal cause for Herder.
In the same period, Kant tried to investigate the conditions
of possibility of illatter and considered the determinations of
attraction and repulsion as cause of impenetrability or extension
of matter in his transcendental conception. He determined
attraction and repulsion separately, and did not ask their relation.
After him, metaphysics of nature, which investigates the premises
of empirical natural science, in other words, studies of the principle
that demonstrates the necessity of existence of matter, enlarged with
two peculiarities. They are both to extend limited considerations
in physics to all of natural phenomena, and to unify the different
determinations of attractive force and repulsive force with a kind
of relation between them. Novalis considered natural phenomena
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as symbols of the hidden transcendent reality and defimted pure
physics researches this reality.18 Schelling defimted natural sci-
ence as follows:
Wissenschaft der Natur ist an sich selbst schon Erhebung
liber die einzelnen Erschemungen und Produkte zur Idee
dessen, worin sie eins sind und ausdem sie als gemeinschaft-
lichem Quell hervorgehen. 19
The concept of force varied greatly m the attempt of understand-
ing immediately various natural phenomena consohdatedly such
as mechanical, thermodynamic, electromagnetic, chemical, vital
phenomena. Cohesive force, affinitive force, electric force, vital
force, etc. were brought forward one after another.
The Investigation of natural phenomena through attraction
and repulsion developed to be unified. The most important
concept was polarity. In Metamorphose der Pflanzen (1790), Goethe
described the formation applying the dual principles of expansion
and contraction m unity, and a series of pair concepts such as
binding-separating, breathing m-breathing out, etc, are constructed
in botany and zoology.
It is Schellmg that formulated the concept of ploarity clearly.
He specified two tendencies of internal structures of nature. One
is the productivity that nature has essentially in itself, the other
is the restriction of this productivity. The latter generates
products by conditioning (bedingung) on the first. Produced
nature depends on the interaction of these two tendencies. One
of these bipolar tendencies becomes by turns, and in the course
of this, the material object is brought about. But matter does not
consists of only two forces, attractive force and repulsive force.
For as far as it is not demonstrated how bipolar active force can
be unified on the same subject, the third active force must be
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introduced.20 This third active force is no more than gravity that
corresponds to the synthetic action of subjectivity.
From three forces is deduced the constitution of matter. The
first step is that "die beiden entgegengesetzten Krafte als in einem
und demselben Punkt vereinigt gedacht werden,"21 the second is
that "die beiden entgegengesetzten Kr云fte als vollig auBer einander,
und durch did Grenze geschieden vorstellt,"^ the third is that "die
beiden jetzt vollig getrennten Krafte eines imd desselben Punktes
sind,"23 and only through these steps three dimentions of matter
is constituted.
In more details, when two opposite forces (positive and nega-
tive force) are united in the first step, the positive is the expansive
force, and the negative determines the direction of the expansive
force alone. On account of it, matter has the one dimentional
extension, after all the length being composed. On the analogy
of linear action, the forces in this case, corresponds to magnet-
ism. In the second, there is the plane in and around the
equilibrium point of two forces, then the dimention of breadth is
constructed. On the analogy of electricity that runs all over the
preface of matter, these forces correspond to electricity in nature.
In the third, one force penetrates the other mutually, brings about
impenetrability of matter, or the third dimention of thickness,
which corresponds to the chemical process.
The concept of force is no longer single invariable agent, but
basic existence which can be changed into various process, and
become a kind of universal basis. Two things brought that
concept of force to Schelling. One is the ideal of unity that urged
him to find a basis which is transformative among various
phenomena. The other is dynamic view of nature, in which beings
in nature can transform qualitatively essentially.
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In the almost same period, many studies appeared, which
investigate relations of qualitatively different natural phenomena.
In 1790, Davy considered the relation between magnetic action
and galvanic one that was originated from sparkling convulsion
of a frog's leg. He found that a strong magnet attracted, repulsed
or rotated the arc between two poles (1821). Orsted showed that
electricity can swing magetic needles (1820). It was found that
galvanic electricity was transformed into heat or light with its
high voltage. Heat producted by some handreds pairs of metal
plates was as strong as to dissolve salts. And it was known that
electricity was transformed into light, using carbons at the place
of inte汀uption of electricity (1815). Dalton studied the connection
between temperature and cubic measure of air, and Gey-Lussac
formulated it mathematically. He proved in 1802 that all kinds
of gases expand at the same rate of the rising of temperature as
far as other conditions are equal.
In this time, some facts of relational subsistence was clarified
in biology. Knight demonstrated the relations between plant's
action and gravity, moisture and light, with the experimental
observations. He considered the relation of a tropistic response
and gravity in On the Direction of the Radicle and Germen During
the Vegetation of Seeds (1806), and the relation of moisture and the
growing direction of a plant s root in Pomora Herefordiensis (1811).
And in being demonstrated that natural phenomena interrelate
and transform to each other, T. Saussure showed the balance of
the adapted and the excreted by plants. Later m these situations
Liebig postulated the law of energy conservation.
In this period, Ritter was interested in the problems in
physiology, chemistry, electromagnetics and optics. He postulated
the problem as such what relation galvanism and electricity have
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or what relation these two and chemism have. He considered
objects from the foundamental bipolar forces, to make a answer
to the problem. It was said that the interaction of foundamental
forces was a chemical action where two objects diminisched and a
new one emerged, and the interaction of them was a electric action
where two touched each other as if the two opposite forces come
to the equilibrium.25 And galvanic action was brought about
where two objects interact both directly and indirectly at the same
time. When qualitative various phenomena related to each other
and were considered to be interchangible, the concept of force also
was not only the basic being but in itself interchanged from one
form to another form, and after all forces come to be a penetrating
through them.
The concept of force is no longer a external agent, it comes
to be a universal reality lying behind different forms and sometimes
appears as both cause and effect on the one hand. A separated
determination such as phenomenon or its ground disperses and
the ground evolutes into a phenomenon and becomes a from of
phenomena, and therefore force becomes a penetrating one through
phenomena in general. Thus the concept of force becomes to
remain to be invariable through the time passage, or becomes to
be determined in the passage of time as each form of phenomena.
Therefore, it is both cause and effect, and both ground and
phenomenon, and then the penetrating one through cause and
effect. Later, in such conditions, elementary forms of the law of
energy conservation are to be postulated.26
III.
As I have already mentioned, from later 18th century to 19th
century, the concept of force changed into many various meanings
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and the concepts of cause confused in itself. Elementary
conceptions, which will become conceptional frameworks domi-
nant in the next generation, were impregnate in immediate variety
in this transitional stage of the concept. I will discuss what
property the concept of force or cause has in each of the condi-
tions, and how three properties of causality separate in these three
conceptions. Of course, situations are so complex that three
properties do not correspond to three conceptions with one to one.
One of these conceptios was Kant's conception and it was
reinforced by Schopenhauer. They separated cause m the passage
of time from cause as ground of the event, and attributed the latter
to the subjectivity, or to the metaphysical region. In this case,
the concept of force as a invariable ground of the change is limited
in the transcendental region, and causality is considered only in
the passage of time. Therefore the equivalence of cause-effect
remainds to be in this conception.
In the second conception, we see that the relation of cause-
effect was incorporated into a higher relation. The concept of force
is both cause and effect and then one impenetrating existence to
them. Each form of the force in causal series is one form of the
force. As a cause or a effect itself is only abstracted from the
higher relation, the equivalence of cause-e打ect is only abstractive
and therefore is not necessary. The higher relation has not a
external cause and is so called cause of itself. In this point of
view, formal cause reappears widely in science (Schelling).
In the third conception, studies of ground or force were not
only abondoned but also expelled positively from scientific re-
serch. It limited its standpoint to the tentative law or rule and
made scientific methodology the only guiding principle. In this
case, causality as the regularity in general made a important role
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in scientific studies. Each of things in causal relations exists by
itself and has its quality in itself. Here we can see that formal
cause reappears widely (Positivism).
( i) Schopenhauer classified grounds into four kinds of such as
generation, cognition, being and motivation in his Uber die vierfache
Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde (1813), and limited the
concept of cause to the one in the passage of time, and then the
concept of force to ground of cognition. He said that:
das Gesetz der Causalit云t sich ausschlieBlich auf Ver一
云nderungen, d. h. auf den Ein-und Austriff der Zust云nde in
der Zeit bezieht, als woselbst es dasjenige Verh云Itnis regulirt,
in Beziehung auf welches der friihere Ursache, der sp云ter
Wirkung heisst und ihre nothwendige Verbindung das
Erfolgen. w
In this case, a series of causality has neither its start nor its end.
Empirical investigation is concered with only the change of
conditions. As far as his considerations depend on the point of
view of ground, interaction of things is constructed from causality.
The concept of force as ground of the change can not be
explained in causal series, and must remain not to be under-
stood. For force products the change and is invariable through
the change, and remainds behind the change, and therefore, force
is not know from the studies of the change of conditions. Late
in mid-19th century, so-called agnosticism was spoken by many
scientists,28 and it seems it had its origin in the above-mentioned
thing.
The law of nature is the norm with which force appears in
series of cause-effect, and it is the band between force and
the series. He enlarged the relation of grounding-grounded
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onesidedly and divined grounds in general into four kinds of
grounds and limited force to the metaphysical region. The region
characteristics of metaphysics appeared through it, and on the
contrary the borderline of empirical sciences was definited.
(ii) Schelling made the polarity the most important relation in
nature in exchange for causality. All of types of physical actions
such as gravity, light, magnetism, electricity, depended on the
polarity. This speclative physics conceptioned the attempt to
describe m details the universal principle that empirical studies
presupposed. The physics had a也erne to attain to the one ideal
to which each of phenomena and products are attributed. In the
totality of these phenomena, the one ideal is determined by the
totality, vice verse. Certainly he thought that as far as descriptions
or explanations of nature are no more than the knowledges
conditioned or determinated, we must know the inner structure
of nature to which these conditions or determinations are to be
added. We ordmally regarded only ・the products as the objects.
Accordingly the only way to grasp the nature before conditioning
is to consider the nature productive action and then empirically
cognited objects its products.
In this case, he conceived the concept of force from the polarity,
and the concept was not a single invariable agent, but a universal
basis through natural phenomena. One step of nature makes itself
with all of determinations in former steps. He presuposes the
hierarchy of nature and its evolution between steps, and causality
is included into a higher relation, that is, interaction. He said that:
Es ist iiberhaupt kein Kausalit云tsverh云Ithis kon-
struierbar ohne Wechselwirkung, denn es ist keine Beziehung
der Wirkung auf die Ursache moglich,--- wenn nicht die
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Substanzen als Substrate des Verh云Itnisses durch emander
fixiert werden." 29
Thus the concept of force is both cause and effect and then
runs through the relation of cause-effect, and it is the represen-
tation of the relation itself. Causality is determined `internally'
by the higher relation. In this view, there are two important results.
(1) The higherrelation has notground or cause for itself outside
it. Therefore it is a causeofitself, a formal cause. Forexample
the finality of organism can not demand its external cause, but
the organism itself is final. The conception of a formal cause
reappears widely in this view. (2) As far as causality is deter-
mined in a higher relation, cause or effect itself is only
abstracted from the latter, and then the contrast of independent
cause with independent effect is impossible. Thus the equiva-
lence of cause-effect is not necessary.
iii ) Positivist, for example, A. Comte, made causality a main
leading principle of empirical studies, and positioned a higher
relation a provisional law or rule in scientific investigations.
Comte recognized as a foundamental principle that propo-
sitions, which can not be reduced to simple statements of each
things have no meanings. Imaginations must subordinate
observations for this reason. In this case, the concept of force
is supernatural and it is the concept before positivistic step and
then the convenient term as a only metaphor.
The scientific law is no more than foundamental descrip-
tion. Each of things to be described, exists by itself, and is
compared with other event. And each of things itself has its
quality. For example, atom has or is its quality, the things by
immediate observations is grasped formal causally. In this
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conceptions, as the absolute or the necessity are excluded,
scientific investigations have its nghtness in the progressive view
of history such as three steps, mythical, metaphysical and
positivistic.
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